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The agglutinative style,1 formerly a product of pastepot and shears,
but now made even more popular by the availability of copying ma-
chines and scotch tape, is characterized by inserting globs of old prose
from earlier opinions into convenient spots in new opinions. Advocates
and judges are especially apt to use the agglutinative style in discussing
canons of statutory interpretation. Pick up almost any Maryland case
or brief and one will find a litany of general rules on how to interpret
statutes. In Soper v. Montgomety County,2 for example, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland created this glob:
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature. Statutes are to
be construed reasonably and with reference to the purposes to
be accomplished . . . . That which necessarily is implied in
the statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed
... . However, neither statutory language nor legislative in-
tent can be stretched beyond the fair implication of the stat-
ute's words or its purpose.3
Cearfoss v. State4 is my favorite example of how a court may enunci-
* Paper delivered as a lecture at the Maryland Rule Day Club, Baltimore, Maryland,
October 10, 1983. The author is grateful for the assistance of Anna Mary Coburn of the Law
Review staff. She has been more co-author than editor, but none of the shortcomings which
may be in this article are hers.
** A.B. 1943, The Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1948, Harvard University.
1. Cardozo, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER EsSAYS 10 (1931).
2. 294 Md. 331, 449 A.2d 1158 (1982).
3. Id. at 335, 449 A.2d at 1160.
4. 42 Md. 403 (1875).
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ate several inconsistent rules in one opinion and then reach a result
without explaining how the various rules of construction were related to
that particular result. Cearfoss reads like a law encyclopedia. The ques-
tion in Cearfoss was simple enough: Did an alcohol control statute bar-
ring drinking on election day also prohibit social drinking between a
host and his guest in a private home on election day?5 The court found
that the statutory language was plain and inclusive and held that the
statute did indeed bar drinking in intimate surroundings. 6 But the
court in Cearfoss also suggested in dicta that a drink given for medicinal
purposes on election day would not be a violation of the statute.7 The
court did not articulate a reason for the possible difference in result;
instead, it invoked a set of miscellaneous rules of statutory construction:
There is no question, as urged by the appellant's counsel,
that in construing this statute the real intent of the Legislature
must prevail over the literal sense, if there be any inconsis-
tency; a thing within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute, unless it be within the intention of the makers.
But where the words are plain, they are the best evidence
of what was meant. Whilst the statute is not to be followed in
its literal terms, if it can be discovered that such was not the
intention, yet the meaning must be ascertained by a reason-
able construction to be given to the provisions of the Act, and
not one founded on mere arbitrary conjecture.
Where clear words are used, to indicate the purpose, there
is no necessity to resort to other aids. No man incurs a penalty
unless the act which subjects him to it, is clearly, both within
the spirit and letter of the statute. Things which do not come
within the words are not to be brought within them by con-
struction ....
Statutes should be interpreted according to the most nat-
ural and obvious import of their language, without resorting to
subtle or forced construction, for the purpose of either lziiing
or extending their operation.
It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrin-
5. Id at 406. The statute in question provided the following:
That it shall not be lawful for the keeper of any hotel, tavern, store, drinking estab-
lishment, or any other place where liquors are sold, or for any person or persons,
directly or indirectly, to sell, barter or give, or dispose of any spirituous or fermented
liquors, ale or beer, or intoxicating drinks of any kind, on the day of any election
hereafter to be held in the several counties of this State.
1865 Md. Laws ch. 191, ctedt 42 Md. at 406.
6. 42 Md. at 408.
7. Id at 406.
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sic circumstances, that a case, for which the words expressly
provide, shall be exempt from their operation.
It is only in cases where the meaning of a statute is doubt-
ful, that the courts are authorized to indulge in conjecture, as
to the intention of the Legislature, or to look to consequences
in the construction of the law.
When the meaning is plain, the Act must be carried into
effect according to its language, or the courts would be assum-
ing legislative authority.'
This convoluted quotation is not unusual. Professor Llewellyn, an
astute observer of judicial dogma, has catalogued twenty-eight pairs of
canonical contradictions!9 Professor Horack in reviewing cases came to
the following conclusion:
When a judicial decision is pegged on one rule of interpreta-
tion and in a succeeding case the contrary result is dictated by
a conflicting but equally authoritative rule, it is time to recog-
nize that we are dealing neither with "rules" nor with "inter-
pretation," but with "explanations" of decisions independently
determined. "
The Court of Appeals of Maryland phrases the various canons of
statutory construction differently, but all of the canons have two things
in common: They say that the job of the court is to discover the actual
intention of the legislature; and they emphasize the importance of statu-
tory language. These canons, particularly when strung together in a
case, have a magisterial tone and an aura of the inexorable absolute.
My aim is to show that these canons of construction are mere boilerplate
and should be abandoned because they often are misleading and incon-
sistent. My proposal is perhaps impolitic, but nevertheless intended to
be useful. Eminent scholars have tackled the issue of statutory construc-
tion,"' and they have made sophisticated, and sometimes radical,
8. Id. at 406-08 (citations omitted).
9. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
10. Horack, The Disintegration of Statutoiy Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 335 (1949).
11. See, e.g., G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); R.
KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE (1969); R. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS
(1974); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947);
Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934), reprinted in 2
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 7 (1965); Nathanson, Administrative Dicreton in the Interpretation of Statutes,
3 VAND. L. REV. 470 (1950); Nutting, The Ambiuity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV.
509 (1940); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law. Statu-
tory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 892 (1982); see also H. BLACK, HAND-
BOOK ON THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS (1896); H. HART & A.
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proposals concerning theories of statutory interpretation. My proposal
is more modest than their analytical discussions. I merely suggest that
inserting rules of interpretation helter-skelter in opinions is misleading
and that the two favorite canons-one requiring a court to search for
the actual intent of a legislature and the other requiring a court to di-
vine the plain meaning of a statute-are too general to be useful in de-
ciding whether a particular statute dictates a particular result.
12
II. THE MYTH OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has insisted that the search for
"legislative intent" is the primary goal of statutory construction. 13 The
search for actual intent, however, is a myth. The legislature is not an
individual with a will but an institution composed of many individuals,
each with a distinct mind and personality. The legislature produces a
product reflecting many different intentions and purposes. Psychoana-
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1410-1411 (tent. ed. 1958) (unpublished manuscript); Lehman, How to Interpret a Diftcult Stat-
ute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489; Page, Statutes as Common Law Pnhc ples, 1944 WIS. L. REV. 175;
Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1982); Sanders & Wade, Legal Writihgs on Statutoy Construction, 3 VAND. L. REV. 569, 580
(1950) (bibliography of articles on statutory construction); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down.- A Critique of Interpret'vism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983).
12. Cf Cox,Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 372
(1947) (The search for legislative intent is not a rule, but rather it reflects a judicial point of
view and thus the methods of statutory interpretation are more important than the meta-
phors used to describe the quest.).
13. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982). In Bledsoe, the court
interpreted a statute which allowed a judge to award the use and possession of the principal
residence of a named couple to the spouse with custody of minor children. See MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-06(a) (1984). The purpose of the statute was to allow the
"children of the family" to continue to live in a familiar environment. Id. The court held that
"children of the family" did not include the children of one of the spouses from a previous
marriage, even if the stepchildren lived in the house during the second marriage. 294 Md. at
194, 448 A.2d at 359. The court in passing noted that:
[I]t is the duty of the courts to declare the law as the General Assembly has made it,
that is, to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. This we have
said on many occasions is the cardinal rule of statutory construction.
Id at 188, 448 A.2d at 356 (citation omitted).
In Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979), the court
again insisted that in construing a statute the goal is to effectuate legislative intent, but was
quick to add that words are the "primary" source for discovering intent. Id at 300, 396 A.2d
at 259. In Bradshaw, the court held that a county charter provision which expressly abolished
the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not abolish the immunity of police officers who com-
mitted negligent acts within the scope of their employment. Id. at 303-05, 396 A.2d at 261-62.
The court reasoned that despite the plain words of the provision, the police officers were
public officials and that the county in waiving its immunity did not intend to abolish the
traditional doctrine of public official immunity. Id. For a discussion of the various formula-
tions of the plain meaning rule, see infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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lysts cannot always tell why individuals do the things they do; certainly
inferring an overall intent from any group action is at a minimum more
problematic. For example, the deletion of a provision from a statute in
the course of passage may be caused by the following: legislators who
are opposed to giving that provision effect; legislators who regard the
provision as superfluous because they believe the law already is that
way; legislators who favor the provision, but are afraid that a court will
find it to be unconstitutional; and legislators who are not sure what the
law is or will be on a particular point and either do not really care or are
willing to allow the courts to decide. Under such circumstances, it is
misleading to talk about "the intent of the legislature."
The way the legislator works also militates against a finding of "in-
stitutional intent." Legislators have various degrees of diligence. They
may not read committee reports or they may misread them. They may
not pay attention to or they may be absent from a crucial hearing or
debate. They may reject the committee's reasoning, but vote with the
committee for other reasons, which may or may not relate to the merits
of the bill.
Furthermore, in the cases that reach the courts, few, if any, legisla-
tors have any specific intent directed toward the particular question for
which construction is sought. The gaps in the statute arise mainly from
the inability of the legislature to foresee all the specific combinations of
circumstances that could arise in adjudication. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland has on occasion candidly recognized that the legis-
lature cannot anticipate all possible problems that may arise in litiga-
tion. In Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 4 for example, the court was
faced with a difficult issue: Did the Maryland General Assembly intend
to require consumer buyers to send notice of a breach of warranty to all
sellers, including the manufacturer, or would notice to the immediate
seller suffice? 5 The court noted that most likely the legislature "never
thought about the problem" when it abrogated the privity of contract
requirement in consumer buyer actions for breach of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability under the Maryland Uniform Commercial
Code. 6 The court held that a buyer need not send notice to the manu-
facturer if notice was sent to the immediate seller.' 7
Professor Hart has pointed out, "In no legal system is the scope
of legal rules restricted to the range of concrete instances which were
14. 53 Md. App. 106, 452 A.2d 192 (1982), aft'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983) (per
curiam).
15. Id. at 107, 452 A.2d at 193.




present or are believed to have been present in the minds of legislators
. . ,"8 The premise of the Maryland canon requiring the search for
legislative intent-that a statute represents an express statement of ac-
tual intention covering all circumstances in which the application of the
statute may reasonably be invoked-is simply a fiction. In District
1199E, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees v. Johns Hopkins
Hospit'al,'9 for example, the court was faced with a typical problem of
statutory construction. In Johns Hopkins Hospital, Maryland's Anti-In-
junction Act2 ° was held to apply to a labor dispute at a nonprofit hospi-
tal. The Act referred only to labor disputes with corporations and
profit-making entities.2 ' The key passage of the opinion, as far as the
rules on interpretation are concerned, was:
It is undisputed that there is no express exemption for non-
profit hospitals in the Maryland Act. While it is true that stat-
utes in derogation of the common law, and especially those
depriving a court of jurisdiction should be strictly construed, it
is a cardinal rule that in construing a legislative enactment
courts should confine themselves to a construction of a statute
as written, and not attempt, under the guise of statutory con-
struction, to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the
statute, or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature.22
The statute, because it did not expressly deal with the issue of ap-
plicability to nonprofit enterprises, could reasonably have been con-
strued either way. The court's formulation is a form of question-
begging, rather than an attempt to analyze the statute and apply it to
the particular facts at hand.
Most courts and advocates have recognized that the search for in-
tent is an illusory quest because intent is a meaningless metaphor for a
nonexistent state of mind. One commentator has called it a hallucina-
18. Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 627 (1958).
19. 293 Md. 343, 444 A.2d 448 (1982).
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 65 (1979). The Maryland statute is modeled upon the
federal Norris-LaGuardia Act.
21. The relevant statutory language was as follows:
In the interpretation and application of this subtitle, the public policy of
this State is declared to be as follows: Negotiations of terms and conditions of labor
should result from voluntary agreement between employer and employees. Govern-
mental authority has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corpo-
rate and other forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers the
individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, and
to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and condi-
tions of employment. Therefore it is necessary that the individual workman have
full freedom . . . to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment . ...
MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 63 (1979).
22. 293 Md. at 359-60, 444 A.2d at 456.
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tion,23 and Dean Landis suggested that at times the search could be
"meaningless and barbaric." 24
Some courts instead try to discern what the legislature would have
intended if it had foreseen or faced the current problem before the
court, or they try to determine what the present or a future legislature
would do if called upon to legislate explicitly on the problem at hand.
Other courts wisely stop using the legal fiction known as "legislative in-
tent" and seek to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected
in the statute. Furthermore, as legislation ages it may become so en-
crusted with judicial decisions that the focus of a court's inquiry is upon
the cases and not the original statutory language or purpose. This pro-
cess is likely to occur when courts must interpret broad statutory man-
dates contained in "constitutive" legislation, such as the antitrust laws,
the National Labor Relations Act, and the various civil rights laws.
It is clear that the search for intent is a fiction because courts uni-
formly shut out direct evidence of the actual intent and motivation of
particular legislators. Whatever the prudential reasons may be for this
practice, it does eliminate a significant source of evidence of intention.
It indicates that something other than actual intent is really the focus of
the inquiry. Many judges frankly admit and many commentators pro-
claim that the courts are looking for something else. As Justice Holmes
put it, "We do not inquire what the legislature meant, we ask only what
the statute means."2 5 In addition, courts often ignore the actual intent
approach and apply a variety of hodge-podge rules of interpretation as
the spirit moves them. The courts apply these canons almost to ensure
that if there were a true or actual legislative intent, it would not be
given effect. The legislators could hardly keep all the canons by which
their work may be construed in mind as they work. If they kept them in
mind, they would never be able to get their work done because, in order
to be sure the laws express their intention, they would have to scrutinize
the language of every bill in the light of all the canons to see when their
actual intent might be perverted by invocation of one canon or another.
If they could so scrutinize the bills, they would also have to know and
keep in mind all the case law in light of which they are presumed to
legislate. If they could do all that, they would have to cope with the fact
that the canons come largely in contradictory pairs and the legislators
would not know which of the canons a court would ultimately decide to
use. For every self-evident pronouncement like Justice Holmes' state-
ment, "We do not inquire what the Legislature or its draftsmen meant,
23. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 409 (1950).
24. Landis, A Note on "Statutoy Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REV. 886, 893 (1930).
25. O.W. Holmes, Theopy of LegalInterpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1921).
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we ask only what the statute means,"'2 6 there is an equally self-evident
and authoritative pronouncement like Justice Holmes' statement in
Johnson v. United States :27
The legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the
law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly,
that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise
of the conclusions expressed in a statute, the change of policy
that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it
is not an adequate discharge of duty for the courts to say: We
see what you are driving at, but you have not said it and there-
fore we shall go on as before.28
The legislature is presumed to know all the decisional law on statu-
tory construction and to legislate in light of it.29 As a factual matter, the
presumption is, to put it charitably, ridiculous. Nobody, not even the
judges, meets that standard. To charge the legislature with acting in
light of all the canons may actually undercut a particular legislative
purpose. For example, there are canons that say repeal by implication is
not favored, or that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed. If literally applied, this latter canon would mean that
all statutes are strictly construed, but fortunately there is an equally
well-settled canon stating that remedial statutes, which presumably der-
ogate most strongly from the common law, are to be liberally construed.
The canon that statutes are to be construed to the fullest extent possible
to avoid unconstitutionality also is an instructive example of how the
cardinal rule that makes actual legislative intent the object of the search
in every case does not really represent the practice of the Court of
Appeals.
Sm'le; v. State,3" for example, involved a statute that made it a mis-
demeanor to display for advertising purposes any visual representation
depicting sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct, or sexual excitement.3"
Sexual conduct is defined as "human masturbation, sexual intercourse,
or any touching of or contact with the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks
of the human male or female, or the breasts of a female, whether alone
or between members of the same or opposite sex, or between humans
26. Id.
27. 163 F.2d 30 (lst Cir. 1908).
28. Id. at 32.
29. See, e.g., Briggs v. State, 289 Md. 23, 33-34, 421 A.2d 1369, 1375 (1980) (legislature is
presumed to have full knowledge of prior and existing law on the subject of a statute it
passes).
30. 294 Md. 461, 450 A.2d 909 (1982).
31. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 416A(d) (1982).
[VOL. 43:647
PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
and animals."3 2 The Maryland General Assembly had deleted from the
bill a provision that would have expressly qualified the prohibitions to
cover only advertisements that were obscene.33 The definition of sexual
conduct in the legislation as enacted would include a medical text show-
ing self-examination of the breasts, and the literal meaning of "sadomas-
ochistic abuse" would have excluded a portrayal of the Crucifixion.3 4
The Court of Appeals saved the day by construing back into the statute
the limitation making the statute applicable only to displays that were
obscene.35 Obscene materials were defined as those catering to a pruri-
ent interest in sex and that taken as a whole had no serious literary,
artistic, scientific, or political value.3 6 The court reasoned that the legis-
lative intent was to protect against obscenity, that obscenity was a con-
cept with constitutional contours, and therefore the legislature must
have intended to enact a statute consistent with the Constitution.3 7
Judge Lowe in State v. Randall Book Corp.,38 in following Smiley, justly
characterized Sm'iey as "practical in result if frugal in explanation."3 9
While there may be a great deal to be said for the result in Smiley as a
matter of social policy, the only thing that can be confidently said about
the decision itself is that the court's holding is the one least likely to
approximate the actual contemporaneous intent of the legislators. No
legislator could have imagined that the bill voted upon would mean
what the court interpreted it to mean.
Not only does the court thus ignore its own requirement to discern
legislative intent, it also invokes other canons that work at cross purposes
to this requirement. One of the most potent instruments for frustrating
actual intent is the requirement that a statute be construed in accord-
ance with the obvious meaning of its language-the plain meaning rule.
As Learned Hand has said, "There is no surer way to misread any docu-
ment than to read it literally."'  Yet the plain meaning rule is a popu-
lar canon of statutory construction often invoked by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland.4" The view that the "plain language" of a statute
32. Id.
33. See State v. Randall Book Corp., 53 Md. App. 30, 31 n.2, 452 A.2d 187, 188 n.2
(1982).
34. Id at 32-33, 452 A.2d at 189.
35. Smiley v. State, 294 Md. 461, 464, 450 A.2d 909, 911 (1982).
36. Id. at 465, 450 A.2d at 911.
37. Id at 464, 450 A.2d at 911.
38. 53 Md. App. 30, 452 A.2d 187 (1982).
39. Id. at 33, 452 A.2d at 189.
40. Guiseppe v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 623 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., concurring), afd
sub nom. Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
41. See, e.g., Briggs v. State, 289 Md. 23, 421 A.2d 1369 (1980). The court in Brzggs ana-
lyzed § 12-702 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, which limited the discretion of a
1984]
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is conclusive of actual intent is self-contradictory. Like any irrebuttable
presumption, it means that the presumed fact is really immaterial. If
the plain language is conclusive of actual intent, then actual intent does
not matter. The only thing that matters is the "plain language." If one
looks to the words of a statute only and ignores everything else, it is
impossible to ascertain actual intent. Actual intent involves a state of
mind, as to which inferences may be fairly made, and all the facts and
circumstances, not just language, must be considered if actual intent is
to be ascertained. The next section discusses the plain meaning rule,
which the Court of Appeals is so fond of invoking.
III. THE "PLAIN MEANING" OF A STATUTE
Under the plain meaning rule, a statute is construed "according to
the ordinary and natural signification of the words used."4 2 The Court
of Appeals uses three different formulations of the plain meaning rule.
The "strict" plain meaning rule says that when there is a plain meaning
that meaning is always conclusive; the courts may never look to anything
else to reach a construction different from the plain statutory lan-
guage.4 3 The second statement of the plain meaning rule is not so in-
trial judge after the appellate court had remanded the case for a new trial or new sentence to
impose a more severe sentence than the sentence previously imposed for the offense. Id. at 26,
421 A.2d at 1371. Section 12-702 provided in part that the reasons for the increased sentence
after a trial de novo must be "based upon objective information concerning identifiable con-
duct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentence was imposed." See MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-702(b)(2) (1984) (emphasis added). The court held that
the plain statutory language barred the resentencing judge from considering an interim con-
viction which occurred after the imposition of the original sentence and which was based on
conduct occurring before the original sentence was imposed. 289 Md. at 33, 421 A.2d at
1375.
The court briefly quoted the standard language on principles of statutory interpreta-
tion and noted that "in a State such as Maryland where debates, reports and other contempo-
raneous legislative history have not usually been recorded and preserved, the words of the
statute itself provide the most reliable indication of its purpose." Id. at 31, 421 A.2d at 1374.
The court argued that a "conviction" did not constitute criminal "conduct," but was merely
a judicial determination of prior criminal conduct. While this semantic distinction is uncon-
vincing, the court did pursue the more useful avenue of analyzing the statute in light of the
Supreme Court cases dealing with increased sentences after retrial. See id. at 33, 421 A.2d at
1375.
42. See, e.g, Lowenthal v. Rome, 294 Md. 277, 282, 449 A.2d 411, 413 (1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (plain language of statute indicates that any person who voluntarily
appeared in a proceeding in which a marriage was annulled or a divorce obtained is disquali-
fied from claiming under a will as a surviving spouse); see also Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n v. Elgin, 53 Md. App. 452, 454 A.2d 408 (1983) (plain language of statute indicates
that WSSC did not have authority to condemn land within town of Poolesville).
43. See, e.g., Koyce v. State Cent. Collection Unit, 289 Md. 134, 140, 422 A.2d 1017, 1020
(1980) (when language is plain and unambiguous it should be given effect in accordance with
the plain meaning of the words; there is no need to look beyond the language of the statute);
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flexible. It states that a statute whose meaning is plain will usually be
construed in accordance with that meaning, but not always.4 4 Accord-
ing to the third statement of the rule, a court may disregard the plain
meaning of a statute, if the "real intent" of the legislature is inconsistent
with the plain meaning.45 Maryland courts refer to these rules as the
Gatewood v. State, 244 Md. 609, 617, 224 A.2d 677, 682 (1965) ("[The] construction of the
statute is neither sensible nor reasonable and manifestly leads to an absurdity, but, if, that is
its plain meaning and if the words are not fairly susceptible of another interpretation, we are
not at liberty to depart from them."); Taylor v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 51
Md. App. 435, 447, 443 A.2d 657, 663 (1982) (court may not surmise a legislative intention
contrary to the words and letters of a statute); American Casualty of Reading v. Department
of Licensing & Regulation, 52 Md. App. 157, 159, 447 A.2d 484, 485 (1982) (plain language
of statute indicates that the verb "file" means to deliver, not to place in transit for delivery,
despite prior adminstrative practice allowing tax return to be deemed filed on time if mailed
and postmarked on date due). The court in American Casually said, "No custom, however long
and generally it has been followed by officials, can nullify the plain meaning . . . of a stat-
ute." Id. at 161, 447 A.2d at 486 (quoting Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 687, 26 A.2d 767,
469 (1942)).
44. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 62, 453 A.2d 1185,
1189 (1982) (usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the legislature if the
language is clear); Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418, 379 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1977)
("[I]f there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need
to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly."); Washington Suburban
Sanitary Comm'n v. Elgin, 53 Md. App. 452, 460, 454 A.2d 408, 413 (1983) (court will look to
ordinary meaning of statute and not strain to find some subtle or forced interpretation of the
law).
45. See, e.g., State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975) ("In construing
statutes. . . results that are unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense should
be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language, with the real legislative
intention prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning."); Sanza v. Mary-
land State Bd. of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 340, 226 A.2d 317, 328 (1966) ("real legislative in-
tent" may prevail over "literal intent")(quoting Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 257, 170 A.2d
212, 214 (1961)). See also Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 331
A.2d 55 (1975) (Eldridge, J., dissenting). In Gould, the court interpreted a statute that pro-
vided for judicial review of decisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board only when
the Attorney General or the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services believed
that an award was improper, as allowing judicial review by mandamus or certiorari for an
arbitrary denial of benefits. The statute said: "There shall be no other judicial review of any
decision made or action taken by the Board .. " MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 10(a) (1981).
The court disregarded the plain words of the statute and reasoned that the legislature did not
intend to deprive the courts of their inherent right to review arbitrary agency action. 273
Md. at 512, 331 A.2d at 71. Judge Eldridge in dissent noted that "no judicial review" meant
exactly what it said and should not be construed otherwise. Id. at 522, 331 A.2d at 76 (El-
dridge, J., dissenting).
But in Lett v. State, 51 Md. App. 668, 680, 445 A.2d 1050, 1057 (1982), the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland was unwilling to disregard the plain language of a statute even
though it readily admitted that the statute was inartfully drafted. The statute in part pro-
vided for mandatory sentencing if (1) a defendant had been convicted on two separate occasions of
a crime of violence where the convictions did not arise from a single incident; and (2) the
defendant had served at least one term in prison as a result of a conviction for a crime of
violence. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1983) (emphasis added). The defendant
had committed two separate violent crimes, but he had been convicted for them on the same
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need arises, but there is no genuine guidance on how to select one of the
three approaches for reading a particular statute.
An argument, of course, can be made for the strict plain meaning
rule. It tends to put off the age of Newspeak and the spread of Alice-in-
Wonderland language. It assumes that words have reasonably uniform
and understandable meanings and forces a legislature to be careful in
deciding how a statute is phrased.4 6 It acts as a prudential constraint on
the judicial search for legislative intent because no intent may be "dis-
covered" that would cause the statute to be read in a manner that con-
flicts with the plain meaning.
A strict plain meaning rule also helps to legitimize judicial interpre-
tation, because it confines a judge to the role of legal exegetist-an ac-
cepted judicial task. The judiciary is less likely to be charged with
usurping the legislative function if it adopts a literalistic attitude toward
every statute.4 7 Although the line between pure statutory interpretation
and judicial lawmaking is not clear, the plain meaning rule, by encour-
aging a conservative attitude toward interpretation, may keep the courts
out of policy areas when they flirt with the danger of misreading the
legislative aim. Difficult issues, such as whether the statute is in har-
mony with prior law or consistent with other legislative policies, are
avoided. Additionally, a strict literalism would obviate Justice Jackson's
complaint that allowing the search for specific "intent" to roam beyond
the face of the statute to a vast array of background materials puts out
of the reach of all but the government and a few large law offices the
knowledge of the law necessary to help conduct clients' affairs and un-
justifiably increases the cost of the legal services. 48
Despite these advantages, the trouble with strict literalism is that a
ruthlessly consistent application is impractical. Judges, who have a re-
sponsibility to reach fair and sensible conclusions, cannot use this ap-
proach consistently because they cannot stomach the results. The
day. 51 Md. App. at 678-79, 445 A.2d at 1056. The court refused to disregard the literal
language of the statute and held that the mandatory sentence could not be imposed because
the defendant was not convicted on "two separate occasions" for the prior two separate vio-
lent crimes. Id.
46. See Horack, supra note 10, at 337 (Words are symbols and therefore have no intrinsic
meaning; nevertheless, words have a commonly accepted meaning and it is fair for the judici-
ary to expect the legislature to adopt the common meaning of a word.).
47. Cf Cox, supra note 12, at 376. (Literalism is part of the conservative tradition in that
it limits the possible scope of judicial legislation.). But see Tate, The Law-Making Function of the
Judge, 28 LA. L. REv. 211, 227 (1968) (Under the guise of literal interpretation, a court may
easily thwart the purpose of a statute.).
48. SeeJackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A.
J. 535, 537-39 (1948) (advocating adoption of uniform principles of statutory construction in
federal courts).
[VOL. 43:647
PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
injustice or absurdity of a strict reading of a statute not carefully written
is often too high a price to pay for certainty in the law and for a judici-
ary secure against charges of encroaching upon legislative functions.
Examples of cases in which applying the plain meaning rule would
prove almost humorous are easy to find. The most famous example is
the Bologna statute that forbade the shedding of blood on the streets.4 9
Did that statute apply to a doctor bleeding his patient? Would it apply
today now that bloodletting is no longer an approved medical treat-
ment? Is a statute forbidding vehicles to pass except on the left, enacted
before the day of multi-lane highways, applicable in a case where a
driver passes a slow car in the left-most lane on an eight-lane highway?5"
Does a statute of descent and distribution give a victim's estate to an
heir who has murdered him?5 There is only one plain meaning to a
statute forbidding the discharge of loaded firearms on a public road or
highway "except for the purpose of killing some noxious or dangerous
animal or an officer in the pursuit of his duty."' 2 But no court would
allow a defendant who shot an officer to take refuge behind a literal
interpretation of the statute.
The courts easily resolve these amusing examples; however, they
are more often pressed with the difficult problem of how to apply gen-
eral statutory language to a particular set of facts.5 3 For example, does a
transaction which meets every statutory requirement of a tax-free corpo-
rate reorganization qualify as such when the transaction has no business
purpose, and in fact has no purpose at all except to turn a transaction
that is taxable into one that is not?54 Does a statute requiring Chinese
immigrants to have a permit to enter this country bar a child born at sea
on the way to the United States from entering without a permit?5 5 Does
a statute barring any legal action against a person who reports child
abuse protect one who turns himself in for the rape of a child?56 Invok-
49. G. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 31.
50. See, e.g., Mooney v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 81 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 1955). For a
discussion of the facts of the case, see Tate, supra note 47, at 229-30.
51. See, e.g., Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 509-10, 165 A. 470, 471-72 (1933) (The court
refused to construe a descent and distribution statute to permit the heirs of a husband who
murdered his wife to inherit their statutory portion of the estate even though the plain words
of the statute allowed the heirs to inherit.).
52. 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 490 (1959).
53. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 473-75.
54. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935) (transaction held not to be "reorganization" within meaning of the statute).
55. Curtis, supra note 23, at 413. (quoting L. LOWELL, CONFLICTS OF PRINCIPLE 82
(1932)).
56. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(j) (1982) (providing that any person making a
good faith report of child abuse or participating in an investigation shall be immune from
1984]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing the plain meaning rule will answer none of these subtle questions of
how to apply the law to the facts.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has rejected the plain language
construction of a statute in numerous cases. In Guardian Life Insurance Co.
of America v. Insurance Commiss'oner,5 for example, the court construed a
Maryland statute which required that a group health policy "delivered
or issued for deliverance" to any person in Maryland include coverage
for the cost of mental health outpatient services.5 8 The health insurance
company argued that the policy was not delivered or issued for deliver-
ance in Maryland.5" Another section of the Maryland statute provided
that in certain cases when a policy is issued to a trustee then "the
[trustee] shall be deemed the policyholder."6 The insurance company
set up a Rhode Island bank as trustee and delivered the policy to the
trustee in Rhode Island. Thus, the insurance company maintained that
the policy was issued and delivered in Rhode Island, not Maryland, and
the Maryland statutes requiring mental health benefits to be included
did not apply even though the ultimate beneficiaries were the employees
of a Maryland corporation which had its principal place of business in
Maryland.6" The Court of Appeals, in an approach reminiscent of the
business purpose doctrine in tax law, held that the statute meant more
than it said-it contemplated a "bona fide" trust, not a scheme to use
the trust form to avoid the mandated coverage.6 2 The court sagely sug-
gested, "[T]hat which necessarily is implicit in a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed." 63
A second example is In rejames D.,64 in which the court held that a
civil liability or a criminal penalty "that might otherwise be incurred or imposed as a result
thereof.").
57. 293 Md. 629, 446 A.2d 1140 (1982).
58. Id. at 636, 446 A.2d at 1144. The Maryland statute provided the following:
Every hospital or major medical insurance policy delivered or issued for delivance
[sic] . . . to any person in this State must include benefits for expenses arising from
treatment of acute mental illness and emotional disorders which in the professional
judgment of practitioners are subject to significant improvement through short-term
therapy.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477E (1979). The provision has been reenacted with the words
"delivered or issued for deliverance within this State" replacing "delivered or issued for de-
livance to any person within this State." See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477E (Supp. 1983).
59. 293 Md. at 636, 446 A.2d at 1144.
60. Id. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 471(3)(1979). The statute provided: "Under a
policy issued to the trustees of a fund established by two (2) or more employers in the same or
related industry . . . [the] trustees shall be deemed the policyholder. ... Id.
61. 293 Md. at 636, 446 A.2d at 1144.
62. Id at 644, 446 A.2d at 1148.
63. Id at 643, 446 A.2d at 1148.
64. 295 Md. 314, 455 A.2d 966 (1983) (juvenile set fire to a model home while he was in
the custody of the Juvenile Services Administration).
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statute making parents liable for the delinquent acts of their children
did not apply when the child was in the custody of the state.6 5 Because
of constitutional considerations, the court construed the statute more
narrowly than a literal reading would require.6 6
And a third example is the court's frequent disregard of the plain
language of express severability clauses. It does so under the theory that
the clause is merely declaratory of an established rule of construction
and is an exhortation to the courts, not a command. The test is whether
the court thinks that the legislature would have enacted the statute if it
knew that part of it was invalid.6 7 In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
A.S Abell Co.,68 for example, the court said that a severability clause was
"merely an aid to interpretation."6 9 The severability issue in Abell in-
volved city ordinances that imposed sales and gross receipts taxes on
advertising in various media by local and out-of-state advertisers. The
court held that the tax as applied to newspapers and radio and televi-
sion broadcasts was unconstitutional because it placed an unreasonable
burden upon freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first amendment.7 y
The court, despite the presence of an express severability clause, held
that the City Council would not have adopted the remaining provisions
of the ordinances if it had known that only the remaining provisions
could be effective.7" The upshot is that the presence or absence of a
clause plainly stating that a statute is severable makes no difference.
The inexorability of plain meaning, in this context at least, is lost.72
There are numerous other cases in which the court has abandoned
65. Id. at 328, 455 A.2d at 972. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-829 (1984).
66. 295 Md. at 327, 455 A.2d at 972.
67. See, e.g., Sanza v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 338, 226 A.2d 317, 327
(1966) (state statute requiring film operators to obtain a license from Board of Censors found
to be unconstitutional only to the extent that criteria other than obscenity were used as stan-
dards for disapproval).
68. 218 Md. 273, 145 A.2d 111 (1958) (city ordinance imposing 4% tax upon purchasers
of advertising space held to violate first amendment of the United States Constitution).
69. Id. at 290, 145 A.2d at 120.
70. Id. at 288-89, 145 A.2d at 119.
71. Id at 290-91, 145 A.2d at 120.
72. The Maryland legislature in 1973 enacted a general severability statute, which pro-
vides that statutes enacted after July I, 1973, are severable unless the statute specifically says
the contrary. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 23 (1981). The statute provides:
The provisions of all statutes enacted after July 1, 1973, are severable unless the
statute specifically provides that its provisions are not severable. The finding by a
court that some provision of a statute is unconstitutional and void does not affect
the validity of the remaining portions of that statute, unless the court finds out that
the remaining valid provisions alone are incomplete and incapable of being exe-
cuted in accordance with the legislative intent.
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the plain meaning rule. In Francois v. Alberti Van &Storage Co.,7 3 for ex-
ample, the court rejected a literal interpretation of a workman's com-
pensation statute which provided that "[i]f a motion for rehearing is
filed, the time within which an appeal can be taken . . . shall com-
mence from the time of the ruling . . . on the motion."7 4 The statute
required that the motion for a rehearing be filed within seven days of
the agency's decision. The petitioner filed his motion for a rehearing
late, but nevertheless argued that the time within which an appeal could
be taken did not begin until the motion for a rehearing was decided.7 5
The court held that the unqualified language did not extend the time
for filing an appeal when the rehearing motion was not filed within
seven days.76 The court was quick to note that "it would be absurd and
inconsistent to acknowledge the seven day requirement for the purpose
of making a motion for rehearing and then to read the same require-
ment out of the statute for the purpose of determining how the time for
an appeal is affected by such motion."77 Of course, the court should be
applauded for abandoning the plain meaning in such a case.
Another example is State v. Fabritz,7  in which a mother who did not
abuse her child, but who failed to take the injured child to the hospital,
was found guilty under a child abuse statute which provided that a par-
ent who causes abuse to a minor child shall be guilty of a felony.79 It
made no difference to the court that literally the defendant did not
"cause any physical injury," but rather caused death by failure to take
steps to mitigate the physical injury caused by someone else.8" In a dif-
ferent case, Pan American Sulphur Co. v. State Department of Assessments and
Taxatzon,8 ' the court held that a statutory tax exemption for personal
property "used entirely or chiefly in connection with manufacturing in
Baltimore City" was available only when the taxpayer was the one using
the property for manufacturing purposes.8 2 The taxpayer claiming the
exemption in Pan American was a supplier of sulfur who stored the sulfur
in warehouses and then shipped it to manufacturers.
8 3
73. 285 Md. 663, 404 A.2d 1058 (1979).
74. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 56(e) (Supp. 1982).
75. 285 Md. at 669-70, 404 A.2d at 1062.
76. Id. at 670, 404 A.2d at 1062.
77. Id.
78. 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975).
79. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)(7) (1982), in which the term "abuse" is defined
as "any physical injury or injuries sustained by a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treat-
ment or as a result of malicious act or acts .... "
80. 276 Md. at 423-24, 348 A.2d at 279-80.
81. 251 Md. 620, 248 A.2d 354 (1967).
82. Id. at 625, 248 A.2d at 357 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 9(23) (1965)).
83. Id at 626, 248 A.2d at 358.
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Perhaps one final example will illustrate that it is impossible to ap-
ply the plain meaning rule in some cases. In B.F Saul v. West End Park
North, Inc.,84 the Court of Appeals of Maryland interpreted a new usury
statute specifically requiring a lender's disclosure of interest rates on
loans to be "stated in percentage calculated to the nearest 2/10 of 1%,"85
as not requiring such disclosure in the case of construction loans. It ap-
peared that construction loans were released in stages with interest sub-
ject to final adjustment and thus were not subject to such precise
statements in advance.8 6 The court adopted the "sensible" and "practi-
cal" solution of requiring the disclosure to set forth the maximum
amount to be collected as anticipated under the contract of indebted-
ness at the date of execution. 7
The plain meaning rule has been criticized as an illusory theoretical
guide to interpreting a statute.8 8 Furthermore, its use also poses practi-
cal problems for both lawyers and courts. Courts frequently tend to find
the meaning plain so that they can reach the desired result quickly. The
court simply quotes the rule and authoritatively declares that the mean-
ing is plain. A good rule of thumb is: Look for the ambiguity in what is
labeled the plain meaning. In American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,89 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court was unanimous in finding that the statute
was plain and unambiguous.' The only thing the justices disagreed
84. 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d 591 (1968).
85. See id. at 722, 246 A.2d at 600 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 49, § 10(a)(2) (1968),
repealed by MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-103 (1983)).
86. Id. at 722-23, 246 A.2d at 600-01.
87. Id
88. See, e.g., Mellinkoff, The Myth of Precizton and the Law Dctionag, 31 UCLA L. REv. 423,
426 (1983) (law dictionary is a symbol not of precision of legal language but of the myth of
precision); Nutting, supra note 11, at 521 (in writing statutes, creating phrases that are free
from doubt is impossible). For a specific discussion of the problem inherent in interpreting
certain "meaningless" terms in a controversial statute, see Note, Employment Discrimination
Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilation Act." An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97
HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1984).
89. 456 U.S. 63 (1982). In American Tobacco, the Court had to determine if§ 703(h) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which created an exemption for bona fide seniority systems, was
limited to seniority systems adopted and in force prior to the effective date of the Act. Id at
69. Section 703(h) provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).
90. See 456 U.S. at 77, 79. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found that Congress intended the exemption to apply only to those seniority systems in exist-
ence at the time of the Act's effective date. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 634 F.2d
744, 749 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc). The Supreme Court majority concluded the opposite and
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upon in the 5-4 decision was what was that plain meaning. Labeling
statutes as plain tends to increase judicial divisiveness because dissenters
are accused of being stupid for not seeing what is plain. Respect for the
court as an institution is not enhanced when the court persists in label-
ing as plain the meaning of a statute as to which the court is almost
evenly divided.
Additionally, the strict plain meaning rule is based upon a false
notion that words can have one intrinsic ideal meaning regardless of
context." Of course, words do have an accepted definition formed
through common usage that may well provide a reference point for as-
certaining meaning. The real question, however, is: How shall one de-
termine the meaning of a text in light of the particular facts at hand?
The plain meaning rule does not give the answer. Professor Lon Fuller
has contended that it is impossible to interpret the words in a statute
without knowing the statute's aim. 2 A court must look at the back-
ground, legislative history, and other independent evidence of purpose
to decipher the meaning of statutory words. Invoking the plain mean-
ing rule merely keeps the court from the task at hand-developing a
reasoned analysis of the statute's history and purpose.
Even if a strict plain meaning rule could be consistently applied, it
would not be an unmixed blessing. Courts should, to some extent, pro-
tect the legislature as well as the people against minor drafting errors,
inadvertencies, and slips of language. The modern legislature has little
time to correct such details.
According to the second, more flexible, Maryland plain meaning
rule, a court will usualy stop inquiry when the words of a statute appear
to have a plain meaning.9 3 This rule is often stated in the following
form:
The principles of statutory construction have been stated
many times by this Court. . . . The ones applicable to this
proceeding include: The cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent. In
determining that intent, the Court considers the language of
an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. A
held that employers who adopted new seniority systems after the effective date of the act
could also claim an exemption under § 703(h). See American Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 77.
91. Horack, supra note 10, at 337.
92. Fuller, Positivi m and Fidelity to Lau-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630,
664-65 (1958).
93. See Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 34, 459 A.2d 196, 200 (1983) (plaintiff who was
injured when part of a dentist's x-ray machine fell on her head did not have to submit her
negligence claim to arbitration as the arbitration statute on its face only applied to traditional
medical malpractice claims).
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corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscu-
rity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to
look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General
Assembly.9 4
It will be noticed that this glob is not a rule, but an observation. As
an observation it is probably correct. In any particular case, however, it
gives no guidance on the crucial question: What are the characteristics
that make a case the unusual one in which courts are not finished their
job, notwithstanding the fact that they have examined the language and
found it to have a plain meaning?
The third articulated approach used in Maryland is a positive de-
nial of the supremacy of a statute's plain meaning in certain cases. Lit-
tle guidance is given as to when the words of a statute should be ignored.
The court usually maintains that the "real intent" of the legislature is
not in accordance with the plain meaning of the statute. Because the
search for the "real intent" is as futile as the search for a strict plain
meaning is delusive, this criterion may be of little help. In the cases in
which the court takes this third approach, needless to say, the court says
nothing about the strict plain meaning rule.
A typical illustration of this third approach is found in Darnall v.
Connor,9 5 in which the court said, "[C]onsiderations such as a known gen-
eral purpose of a statute have led the court to find and give effect to
legislative intentions in tax and penal statutes, not entirely conforming
to words used ... ."96 This theme is repeated in the more recent case
of Sanza v. Magland State Board of Censors,9 7 in which the court said that
the setting, the objectives and purposes of the enactment may require
that the "real" legislative intent prevail over the "literal" legislative
intent.98
94. Board of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 62, 453 A.2d 1185, 1188-89
(1982) (citation omitted).
95. 161 Md. 210, 155 A. 894 (1931) (statute providing for collateral inheritance tax when
grantor "died seized and possessed" of the estate interpreted broadly to include equitable
interests).
96. Id. at 216, 155 A. at 897.
97. 245 Md. 319, 340, 226 A.2d 317, 329 (1966) (statute requiring films to be submitted to
the Board of Censors, if literally construed, would require a father to obtain state approval
before showing home movies to his children). See also State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348
A.2d 275, 279 (1975) (The real intention may prevail over the literal intention "even though
such a construction may seem to be contrary to the letter of the statute.").





In truth, neither the literal language of a statute nor some general
statements concerning the intent of the legislature provide specific an-
swers to the difficult questions of statutory construction. What, then, is
my proposal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland? Excise the globs,
and tell every other court in the state to do the same. These globs, like
almost all general propositions, do not, as Justice Holmes noted, decide
concrete cases. The best that can be said for them is that they are sur-
plusage. If so, the cases would not be decided differently if the globs
were deleted, nor would the opinions be less intelligible if shortened by
the deletion. The West Publishing Company would get a little less rich,
the lawyers a little less poor, the secretaries and law clerks a little less
tired, and everyone's eyes a little more rested. These are real, if modest,
gains.
The globs, however, are less innocent than mere surplusage. Their
real vice is that they do not speak truth, and especially if taken seriously,
they are confusing and misleading. They do not describe the actual
conduct of the court; they are often inconsistent with each other, and on
close analysis, they are self-contradictory. They are proof that aggluti-
nation inhibits ratiocination.
Chuck the canons too. They are not principles of interpretation.
The language, style, and jurisprudential stance of the cases purporting
to be guided by the canons are unfortunate. The canons obscure the
factors actually at work in the construction of statutes. The real work of
construction comes before a particular canon is chosen to be determina-
tive. Statutory construction is a matter of analysis and judgment in
each case. The factors justifying the conclusion that one construction is
preferred should be discussed directly without being obscured by a use-
less conceptual screen. Fictions have had their usefulness in legal his-
tory, and as Dean Pound has pointed out, were the only "permissible"
method of legal growth when the law was sacred, legislatures were less
active, and there were rigid theories of the judicial function that would
have made candor about the judicial task unacceptable. 99 But as Pro-
fessor Calabresi has pointed out, the fictions are subject to manipula-
tion, and are a cover for sub silentio arbitrariness.' 0 0 They darken the
path of the lawyer or the judge and complicate the job because the ca-
nons are just another dangerous diversion from the real task. Justice
Frankfurter summed up the problem when he said:
To strip the task of judicial reading of statutes of rules that
99. R. POUND, supra note 52, at 479-84.
100. G. CALABRESI, supra note 11, at 175.
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partake of the mysteries of a craft serves to reveal the true ele-
ments of our problem. It defines more accurately the nature of
the intellectual responsibility of a judge and thereby subjects
him to more relevant criteria of criticism. Rigorous analysis
also sharpens the respective duties of legislature and courts in
relation to the making of laws and to their enforcement."
Courts must come to grips directly with their relationship to legisla-
tures. It will not help to solve these problems by concealing them with
fictions compounded of equal parts of hyperbole and hypocrisy. Repeti-
tion of confusing and meaningless tenets of construction cannot help but
undermine confidence in the judicial process. The Court of Appeals
should turn instead to the task of explaining more forthrightly its rea-
sons for adopting a particular construction in an individual case.
101. Frankfurter, supra note 11, at 545.
